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CERCLA DERIVATIVE SUITS 
PRIMO FONTANA * 
Corporations frequently incur liability pursuant to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 
Pursuant to the statute, however, the officers and directors of such corpora-
tions cannot be held directly liable. Despite this statutory protection, when 
corporations violate CERCLA, shareholders may be able to use a derivative 
suit to hold officers and directors liable based on the corporate actors' 
fiduciary duty of care. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the early 1980s to al-
low governments or private parties to recover environmental cleanup 
costs from those responsible for the spills or releases of hazardous 
substances. 1 Although corporations are liable under the statute, indi-
vidual officers and directors, in their roles as such, have been insu-
lated from liability under CERCLA in instances where their compa-
nies were liable.2 Rather than imposing liability on such corporate 
actors for their positions in the management and operation of corpo-
* Proofing Editor, 1999-2000, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw RE-
VIEW. 
1 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). The term "hazardous substance" is defined within CERCLA. 
See id. § 9601(14). Virtually all pollutants are included, except petroleum products and 
wastes excepted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act. See id.; Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6921 (West 1999). 
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14); see, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Phann. & Chem. Co., 
Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding that de-
fendant's liability was based not on his status as a corporate officer and employee, but on 
his personally arranging for the transportation and disposal of hazardous substances on 
behalf of the corporation); Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 1036, 
1039-40 (D. Mass. 1991), vacated, 67 F.3d 981 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding defendants not li-
able as directors since they did not personally participate in the conduct that violated 
CERCLA); Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the ''Erosion'' of Traditional 
Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 259, 263 (1992) (noting that "[alctive involve-
ment by the corporate actor in the CERCLA violation, as opposed to mere status as an 
owner or officer, is still a prerequisite to imposition of liability"). 
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rations, officers and directors have only been held liable under CER-
ClA when they are somehow directly involved in pollution incidents.3 
In order to impose liability on directors and officers qua directors 
and officers of companies that incur CERClA liability, stockholders 
can use the derivative suit mechanism.4 Derivative suits compel a cor-
porate board to bring suit against an individual, typically an officer or 
director, who has harmed the corporation.5 If the suit is successful, 
the liable party will be obligated to pay damages directly to the corpo-
ration itself, an arrangement which, in theory, benefits the sharehold-
ers who suffered from the original harm.6 
Section I of this Comment begins with a discussion of the role of 
officers and directors in the modern corporation, as well as a descrip-
tion of their fiduciary duties. Section II outlines CERClA's legislative 
history and purpose. Section II also explores the current liability for 
directors and officers under CERClA. Finally, Section III of this 
Comment argues that current CERClA liability is inadequate, and 
that derivative suits should be allowed to proceed against the individ-
ual corporate officers and directors who violate CERClA. 
I. CORPORATE LAw PRINCIPLES 
This portion of the Comment will discuss principles of corporate 
law that are germane to possible CERClA derivative suits. This sec-
tion begins with a discussion of the role of officers and the board of 
directors within a corporation. Then, a discussion of officers' and di-
rectors' fiduciary duties will follow, along with a discussion of the 
Business Judgment Rule (BJR), which is closely related to those du-
ties. This section concludes with a discussion of derivative suits, which 
are usually brought when one of the fiduciary duties has been vio-
lated. The section concludes with a description of the requirements 
that shareholders must meet in order to establish a derivative claim. 
3 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 263. 
4 See Laurie Galer Ohliger, Note, Disincentive to Holding Corporate Office-How Risky is Di-
rector and Officer Business in Corporate America Today Under CERCLA, 7 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & 
TECH. J. 83, 99-100 (1988) (mentioning the possibility of such suits); cf. Maya K. van Ros-
sum, Corporate Noncompliance With the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts: Theories to Hold a DiTec-
tor Personally Liable, 13 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 99,105-28 (1993) (discussing derivative suits against 
directors for violations of other environmental laws) ; see generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAw 639-74 (1986) (providing a general discussion about shareholders' suits). 
5 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 639. 
6 See id. 
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A. The Roles of the Board of Directors and the Officers 
1. The Board of Directors 
According to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA) , each corporation must have a board of directors (Board). 7 
The model statute requires that all of the corporation's affairs be ex-
ercised by or under the authority of the Board.8 This generalized no-
tion ofleadership has been called the "duty of oversight. "9 
However, scholars of both corporate law and business have noted 
that contrary to the broad duties suggested by model statutes such as 
the RMBCA, the actual role of the Board is much more limited.10 
There are a number of reasons for limiting a Board member's role, 
most of which are practical.ll According to Dean Robert Clark of 
Harvard Law School, the MBCA12 rule on directors' duties was drafted 
with these limitations in mind, and was meant "to preclude any possi-
bility ... that the section might be interpreted to require active in-
volvement by boards in day-to-day affairs of corporations. "13 Thus, 
modern corporate law recognizes that directors cannot take part in 
every aspect of the management of the corporation, but, at the same 
time, courts have warned that directors are not to be mere ornamen-
tal figureheads, but rather "essential component[s] of corporate gov-
ernance. "14 
7 See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984). The RMBCA was ueated by the 
Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAw AND POLICY 35 (4th ed. 1998). 
It was adopted in 1984, and thirty-five states have enacted corporation statutes modeled on 
it, or its predecessor, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). See id. 
S See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01. 
9 See GREGORY V. VARALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 1 (1996). 
10 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 106; MYLES M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 
10-42 (1986). 
11 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 109. 
12 The MBCA was the predecessor to the RMBCA. See SOLOMON ET AI.., supra note 7, at 
35. 
13 Id. 
14 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (NJ. 1981). 
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2. Officers 
The officers of a corporation are basically its more important ex-
ecutives. I5 They are required to follow the duties set forth for them in 
the corporation's bylaws and follow the direction of the Board.I6 
According to the RMBCA, an officer will not be liable for any ac-
tion taken in her role as such, or any failure to take any action, if she 
performs her duties in compliance with section 8.42 of the RMBCAP 
Under section 8.42, an officer must discharge her duties in good 
faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a manner that he 
or she reasonably believes is in the best interests of the corporation)8 
In discharging their duties, officers may rely on the opinions of oth-
ers, as long as their reliance is warranted. I9 Thus, under this standard, 
officers are granted broad protection from personal liability.20 Like 
directors, however, officers are also subject to the bonds of the corpo-
rate fiduciary duties.21 
B. Fiduciary Duties 
The directors and officers of a corporation owe fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty to the corporation's shareholders.22 The duty of 
loyalty is a duty that "prohibits fiduciaries from taking advantage of 
their beneficiaries by means of fraudulent or unfair transactions. "23 
The duty that is more important for purposes of this Comment is not 
the duty of loyalty, however, but the duty of care.24 The duty of care, 
according to Dean Clark, is the director's or officer's duty to "exercise 
that degree of skill, diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent per-
15 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 114. 
16 See id. 
17 See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (1984). 
18 Seeid. § 8.42(a). 
19 Seeid. § 8.42(b)-(c). 
20 See id. 
21 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 123-36, 141-50. 
22 See generally Graham v. AlJis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (discussing 
the duty of care); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the duty of 
loyalty). 
23 CLARK, supra note 4, at 141. Dean Clark illustrates four paradigms of duty of loyalty 
circumstances: (1) basic self-dealing; (2) executive compensation; (3) the taking of corpo-
rate or shareholder property; and (4) corporate action with mixed motives. See id. at 141-
50. 
24 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 129-31; In reCaremark InCI Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 967-
70 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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son would exercise in similar circumstances. "25 Thus, even when di-
rectors or officers engage in actions for the benefit of the corporation 
and its shareholders, the duty of loyalty may be satisfied but the duty 
of care could still be violated.26 As long as officers and directors satisfy 
their fiduciary duties when they take action on behalf of the corpora-
tion, they will virtually always be insulated from personal liability, not-
withstanding the results oftheir actions.27 
C. The Business judgment Rule 
Closely related to the duty of care is the management-friendly 
Business Judgment Rule.28 The BJR has been defined in a number of 
nebulous ways.29 For the purposes of this discussion, however, Dean 
Clark's definition of the BJR is most suitable.30 According to Dean 
Clark, "[t]he rule is simply that business judgment of ... directors will 
not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the 
directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise 
of business judgment-even for judgments that appear to have been 
clear mistakes-unless certain exceptions apply. "31 Thus, directors 
and officers are generally presumed to be using the requisite due care 
when making business judgments.32 In order to best understand the 
contours of the BJR and how it could possibly apply to CERCLA ac-
tions, it is helpful to analyze the more important cases and the con-
cepts around which they were decided. 
25 CLARK, supra note 4, at 123. 
26 See id. 
27 See, e.g., Graham, 188 A.2d at 129-31; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-70. 
28 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 123. 
29 See, e.g. , Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,885 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that "the fact is that li-
ability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply because of bad judg-
ment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been 
doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule"); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 80S, 812 (Del. 
1984) (noting that "a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action was taken in the best interests of the company"). 
30 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 123. 
31 [d. These exceptions are for instances when the acts are illegal, are not informed, or 
are grossly negligent. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 761-63 (3d Cir. 
1974);]oy, 692 F.2d at 886; Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985). 
32 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 123. 
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1. The Action Requirement and the Possibility of a Duty to Monitor 
In general, the BJR protects active decisions, and thus there is no 
protection for directors or officers who fail to act.33 This notion be-
comes especially important in instances where subordinate employees 
violate laws during periods when they are under the purported super-
vision of the corporation's officers and directors. 34 In the past, it was 
generally thought that a director did not have a duty to take action 
against the illegal acts of subordinates as long as they were not on no-
tice of suspicious acts or activities.35 However, the recent Delaware 
Chancery Court decision in In re Caremark International Derivative Liti-
gation has led some to believe that directors and officers may have an 
affirmative "duty to monitor" the behavior of subordinate employ-
ees.36 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court case of Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers was a seminal case regarding the possibility of a directorial 
duty to monitor for the illegal acts of subordinates.37 In that case, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors of a corporation 
could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because their subor-
dinates had violated anti-trust laws. 38 
The plaintiff shareholders argued, in part, that the directors 
should have implemented a system to detect such employee miscon-
duct. 39 They based their suit on the United States Supreme Court's 
precedential decision in Briggs v. Spauldinglio and similar cases that 
imposed upon corporate directors the duty to use the amount of care 
the "ordinarily careful and prudent" person would use in similar cir-
33 See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820-24 (NJ. 1981). 
34 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 127 (Del. 1963); In re 
Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
35 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130-31. 
36 See 698 A.2d at 969-70. 
37 See188 A.2d at 130-31. 
38 Seeid. at 131. 
39 See id. at 127-32. For a discussion of the importance of such monitoring systems, see, 
for example, Internal Compliance Measures Needed to Stop Crimes, Attorneys, Officials Say, 29 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1067, 1068 (1998) [hereinafter Internal Compliance]; Dan K. Webb et aI., 
Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAw. 617, 657-
59 (1994). 
40 See 141 U.S. 132 (1891). In Briggs, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
bank's directors were not liable for their failure to prevent a loss to the corporation. See id. 
at 165-66. However, Chief Justice Fuller did mention that even though directors could 
trust their subordinates to run the business, the Board still had a duty of "reasonable su-
pervision" over the corporation, and that the directors could be liable for losses that were 
the result of the Board's "gross inattention" to the activities of its employees. See id. 
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cumstances.41 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant directors, in 
order to satisfy that duty of care, should have implemented a "system 
of watchfulness" that would have brought any subordinate miscon-
duct, including that which resulted in the Graham suit, to their atten-
tion, allowing the Board to stop the illegal acts before the corporation 
was harmed.42 
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' rea-
soning and their reliance on the earlier precedents.43 The court rea-
soned that Briggs stood for the proposition that directors could rely 
on the "honesty and integrity" of their subordinates until something 
happened to arouse their suspicion that an employee should not be 
trusted.44 If there was such a tip off, and the directors failed to re-
spond appropriately, then they could possibly be liable for any result-
ing losses to the corporation.45 Without such notice, however, the 
Graham court said that directors had no duty to "ferret out wrongdo-
ing which they have no reason to suspect exists."46 Since the director 
defendants in Graham did take action as soon as they were aware of 
the subordinate misconduct, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
no liability could be imposed.47 
The notion of what constitutes grounds for suspicion and how 
prepared directors must be to counter illegal conduct within the cor-
poration was further discussed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank.48 In Francis, the defendant was a director 
and the largest shareholder of an incorporated reinsurance busi-
ness.49 During the period that the defendant was a director, her sons, 
who were also officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporation, 
misappropriated funds from the company, causing an involuntary pe-
tition in bankruptcy to be filed on the company's behalf.50 The trus-
41 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
42 See id. There is some disagreement about when lawbreaking actually injures the cor-
poration. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Directur Have a Duty Always to Obey the 
Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 729, 776-80 (1996); Daniel R. Fischel, The COIporate Governance 
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1271 (1982). Some commentators believe that as long as 
the violations result in an economic benefit, they do not harm the corporation. See Fischel, 
supra, at 1271; see generally infra notes 311-329 and accompanying text. 
43 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 [d. 
47 See id. at 130-31. 
48 See 432 A.2d 814, 819-20 (N J. 1981). 
49 See id. at 816. 
50 See id. at 819. 
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tees in bankruptcy sued, and although they were not shareholders (to 
whom the duty of care is generally owed), the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey found that the directors owed the trustees a duty similar to the 
duty of care pursuant to the New Jersey Business Corporation ACt.51 
According to the Act, directors must "discharge their duties in good 
faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily 
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like posi-
tions."52 
The defendant in Francis was in no way involved in the activities 
of the corporation.53 She had only briefly visited the corporate offices 
on one occasion, and she had never read or even obtained the com-
pany's annual financial statements. 54 She did not understand the ba-
sics of the reinsurance industry, and, perhaps most important to the 
court, she made no effort to assure the policies or practices of the 
corporation complied with the custom of the industry or the laws that 
regulated the industry.55 According to the court, if she had any 
knowledge about the industry, and had taken the time to review the 
internal documents, she would have discovered her sons' activities, 
and presumably, would have been able to take action to prevent any 
further damage to the corporation.56 
The Francis court accordingly held the defendant personally li-
able for the company's losses because her failure to take remedial ac-
tion constituted a breach of the duty of care.57 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court reasoned that as part of their duty of care, directors are 
obligated to keep personally informed about the activities of the cor-
poration.58 Since the defendant did not satisfy this obligation, which 
constituted a breach of her duties as a director, and losses resulted, 
she was held personally liable.59 
Although it seemed that Graham v. Allis Chalmers was a strict limi-
tation on the theory that the failure to monitor subordinate behavior 
could constitute a violation of the duty of care,60 former Delaware 
51 See id. at 820-24. 
52Id. at 820 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14); cf Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984). 
53 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 819. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 826. 
57 See id. 
58 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 822. 
59 See id. at 826. 
60 See 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
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Chancellor William Allen's recent opinion in In re Caremark Interna-
tional Derivative Litigation seems to increase the chances for successful 
suits based on such a claim.61 In Caremark, Chancellor Allen was asked 
to approve a settlement between the shareholder plaintiffs and the 
corporation against whom they had brought a derivative suit.62 Like 
Graham, this case also involved illegal conduct by subordinate em-
ployees, specifically, violations of the Anti-Referral Payments Law, 
which prohibits health care providers from paying any form of remu-
neration for the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients.63 The 
plaintiffs sued on the theory that the board of directors, through its 
failure to proactively implement a monitoring system to notifY the di-
rectors of such illegal behavior, allowed the illegal conduct to "de-
velop and continue" to an extent that resulted in high losses to the 
corporation.64 Since this failure to monitor was a lack of "due atten-
tion," the type required by the duty of care, the plaintiffs wanted to 
impose personal liability on the Board for the losses incurred by the 
corporation.65 
In analyzing this claim, the Chancellor started by recognizing the 
limitations on the role of corporate Boards.66 Legally, Boards are re-
quired only to authorize the corporation's most significant acts or 
transactions, and thus that is where most of their attention is fo-
cused.67 As a result, most decisions of the corporation will not be the 
subject of the directors' attention.68 Even though this is true, and le-
gally acceptable, many of the business decisions made by employees 
and even officers far from the view of the Board can result in illegal 
acts and other activities that can cause losses to the corporation.69 
Chancellor Allen then made an analysis of Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,70 and its application to the modern cor-
61 See698A.2d 959, 968-70 (Del. Ch.1996). 
62 See id. at 960. For a discussion of derivative suits, see infra notes 114-129 and accom-
panying text. 
63 See Carmuzrk, 698 A.2d at 961-62. 
64 See id. at 967. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 968; see also REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.02 (1994). 
67 See Carmuzrk, 698 A.2d at 968. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See generally 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); see also supra notes 37-47 and accompanying 
text. 
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poration.71 According to his interpretation of the precedent, Graham 
did not stand for the proposition that directors had no duty to im-
plement "information gathering and reporting systems" to monitor 
compliance with applicable laws.72 Rather, he said that Graham merely 
held that unless there were grounds to suspect deception on the part 
of subordinates, corporate Boards and officers could not be charged 
with any wrongdoing for "assuming the integrity of employees and the 
honesty of their dealings on the company's behalf. "73 
Moreover, the Chancellor added that a broader interpretation of 
Graham, one that did not impose any duty to monitor, would not be 
accepted by the modern Delaware Supreme Court for three reasons.74 
The first reason is the clear message stated by the state's highest court 
in a number of well-publicized opinions,75 that the corporation law of 
Delaware takes the role of the corporate Board seriously.76 Second, in 
order for the corporate Board to live up to its duty of care, appropri-
ate information is necessary.77 Monitoring systems, presumably, would 
assist the Board in gathering this information.78 Finally, there is the 
potential impact of the federal organizational sentencing guidelines,79 
which could lead to potential increases in penalties for corporations 
that violate federallaws.80 
Thus, in order to satisfy their obligation to be reasonably in-
formed about the activities of the corporation, Boards should have 
monitoring systems in place in order "to provide senior management 
and ... the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to al-
low management and the board . .. to reach informed judgments 
concerning ... the corporation's compliance with law."81 
71 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969. 
72Id. 
73Id. (citing Graham, 188 A.2d at 130-31). 
74 See id. at 969-70. 
75 See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communi-
cations v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). For a discussion of Van Gm-kom, see infra 
notes 91-105 and accompanying text. 
76 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1993). 
The guidelines generally increased penalties for corporations, but they did authorize lower 
penalties for corporations that took preventative measures to avoid misconduct, such as 
monitoring systems. See Webb, supra note 39, at 619. 
80 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969-70. 
81 Id. at 970. 
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Once such a system is implemented, the details of the system are 
matters of business judgment protected by the BJR.82 Systems are not 
expected to detect every corporate violation of applicable laws and 
regulations.83 The system, however, according to the Caremark court, 
should be "in concept and design adequate to assure the board that 
appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner 
as a matter of ordinary operations. "84 Thus, as a result of this analysis, 
the failure to have such a system in place could lead to director liabil-
ity for losses caused by the violation of applicable legal standards.85 
On the facts before him in the Caremark case, Chancellor Allen 
found that the Board could not be liable for a failure to monitor.86 
The Board had information systems in place that "represented a good 
faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts," and as a result, the 
Board had adequately monitored the company's activities.87 Based on 
this finding, the Chancellor held that the Board had lived up to its 
duty of oversight over the corporation, and thus the directors would 
not be held liable for the losses incurred because of their subordi-
nates' activities.88 
2. The InformedJudgment Requirement 
When directors make business judgments in good faith, they are 
almost always protected by the BJR.89 In some instances, however, di-
rectors can lose the protection of the BJR and incur personal liability 
for business judgments that lead to corporate losses.9o One such situa-
tion is illustrated in the well-known case of Smith v. Van Gorkam, a 
Delaware Supreme Court case in which the members of the Board 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 [d. 
85 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
86 See id. at 971-72. 
87 [d. 
88 See id. 
89 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968) (holding that de-
rivative suit plaintiffs did not state a cause of action because "the decision ... [was] one 
properly before directors and the motives alleged in the ... complaint showed no fraud, 
illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision"). Note that this formula-
tion is so broad that it seems to say that shareholder claims may only be based on breach of 
loyalty or some fraudulent or illegal act. See id. 
90 SeeJoyv. North, 692 F.2d 880, 897 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that "[w]hatever its merit 
... the business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justifY its exis-
tence"). 
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were liable for making a decision with insufficient information.91 The 
plaintiff shareholders brought a derivative suit against the Board of 
Trans Union Corporation in the wake of a proposed merger in which 
Trans Union was the target.92 Trans Union's CEO, Van Gorkom, had 
proposed the possible merger to the corporate Board, and the Board 
approved the merger based only on Van Gorkom's presentation, the 
presentations of a few other officers, and the fact that the per-share 
stock price being offered in the proposed transaction was higher than 
the market value of Trans Union's stock at the time.93 
In considering the Board members' personal liability, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court noted that the general rule was that the BJR 
would not protect directors who made decisions that were unintelli-
gent or ill-advised.94 This requirement of informed judgment stems 
from the duty of care.95 Thus, when directors proceed, they must as-
sess all information with a "critical eye. "96 When reviewing whether or 
not business judgments are adequately informed, courts apply a gross 
negligence standard.97 
Analyzing the Trans Union merger against the gross negligence 
standard for informed judgment and the requirements of Delaware 
statutory law,98 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Board had 
not made an informed businessjudgment.99 The Board made its deci-
sion based solely on Van Gorkom's presentation and another presen-
tation by a member of senior management regarding feasibility.lOO 
Neither of the presentations provided enough information about the 
merger to give the Board an accurate representation of its possible 
impliCations. IOI Moreover, the Board meetings were called hastily and 
the possible acquiring party imposed urgent time constraints on the 
deal.102 These circumstances, according to the Van Gorkom court, 
should have led the Board to make further inquiries about the deal,103 
91 See 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985). 
92 See id. at 863-70. 
9~ See id. at 869. 
94 See id. at 872. 
95 See id. 
96 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. 
97 See id. at 873. 
98 See DEL. CODEAN"N. tit. 8, § 251 (b) (1991). 
99 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874. 
100 See id. at 875. 
101 See id. at 874-75. 
192 See id. at 875. 
103 See id. 
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Even though the proposed merger would have benefited the 
shareholders because of the relatively high price offered, the inade-
quate procedures imposed personal liability on the directors,l04 Thus, 
there is a great deal of importance ascribed to the informed judgment 
requirement, since directors can be penalized for a failure to make 
informed judgments even if those judgments could result in financial 
benefit to shareholders.lo5 
3. The Legal Activity Requirement 
Directors and managers will not be protected by the BJR when 
their actions are illegal.106 For example, in Miller v. American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., the shareholder plaintiffs sued the defendant direc-
tors over losses that resulted from the corporation's failure to collect 
on a past-due debt.107 The defendant corporation, AT & T, provided 
communications services to the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.lOS AT & T failed 
to collect on the DNC's $1.5 million bill, which, according to the 
plaintiffs, resulted in a violation of federal campaign spending laws.109 
The Third Circuit allowed the suit to proceed, reasoning that the 
BJR would not apply since the Board had breached federal law.llo 
Moreover, the court noted that not only had the corporation violated 
federal law, but had also contravened a "clearly enunciated" policy of 
Congress.lll Congress had enacted the corporate campaign laws for 
two purposes: first, to curb the influence of corporations in the politi-
cal process, and second, to stop corporations from using corporate 
funds to benefit political parties without the consent of the stock-
holders.ll2 The fact that the shareholders were within the group for 
whose protection the statute was enacted gave strength to their claim, 
104 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875-78. 
105 See id. at 875. 
106 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271; see generally Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 
F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y 1947), reh'gdenied, 75 N.E.2d 
274 (N.Y 1977); Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.YS. 351 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1909); Beveridge, supra 
note 42. 
107 See 507 F.2d at 762. 
108 See id. at 76l. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. at 762. 
111 See id. at 763. 
112 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763. 
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and the Third Circuit thus found that the Miller case presented "a par-
ticularly appropriate basis" for finding a breach of the duty of care.ll3 
D. The Derivative Suit 
One of the most important mechanisms of accountability for 
corporate officers and directors is the shareholder's derivative suit.114 
In a derivative suit, the shareholder or shareholders sue on behalf of 
the corporation for any harm done to the corporation.115 During this 
procedure, the corporation is the nominal defendant, and the share-
holder compels the corporation, through its directors, to sue a third 
party, typically an officer or director, on behalf of the corporation it-
self.l16 Any damages are consequently paid directly to the corpora-
tion. 117 
1. The Demand Requirement 
In order to proceed with a derivative suit, the plaintiff share-
holder must first satisfy what is known as the "demand require-
ment. "118 In virtually all United States jurisdictions, before a share-
holder's suit can be brought, the shareholder must first make a 
demand on the corporation's board of directors for it to remedy the 
situation that is the basis of the shareholder's complaint.1l9 If the di-
rectors take action to remedy the situation, either by bringing suit 
against the third parties implicated in the shareholder's derivative 
claim or some other corrective act, then a shareholder suit will not be 
allowed to proceed.120 
113 [d. The question of whether or not this action actually resulted in a loss is an inter-
esting one. See id. at 763 n.5. Although the debt was not paid, there may have been some 
non-monetary gain to the corporation through increased influence. See id.; see also Fischel, 
supra note 42, at 1271. It seems that, according to this opinion, the value of the increased 
influence could not be considered since the actions leading to that increase were illegal. 
See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763; see also infra notes 256-263 and accompanying text. 
114 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 639; see generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985). 
115 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 639. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 639-40. 
118 See id. at 640; DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS § 5.07 
(1987). 
119 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 640. 
120 See id. 
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If the directors refuse to sue after a shareholder demand, then a 
number of issues arise.l2l If the suit is against a third party who is not 
involved in any way with the management of the corporation, then 
the director-protective BJR most likely applies, and the directors' deci-
sion not to sue would stand, thereby barring the plaintiff's suit.122 If, 
on the other hand, the claim involves corporate management or di-
rectors, then shareholders may be able to proceed with the suit even 
after a director refusal to sue if the plaintiff can show that the direc-
tors are "personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing 
in a way calculated to impair their exercise of business judgment on 
behalf of the corporation, or that their refusal to sue reflects bad faith 
or breach of trust in some other way. "123 
Another option for shareholder plaintiffs in circumstances where 
management is implicated in the allegations is to plead the futility of 
any demand.124 In instances when the good faith of a director or a 
group of directors is called into question, the courts do not expect 
that the defendant directors will give adequate consideration to the 
shareholder demand for a lawsuit.125 Thus, in such instances, courts 
will generally excuse the demand requirement. 126 
2. CERClA and Derivative Suits 
For corporations, the costs of a CERClA recovery due to envi-
ronmental contamination by the company can be staggering.127 In 
such instances, it is likely that corporate Boards and/or officers may 
have violated their duty of care through a failure to monitor the ac-
tivities of their subordinates.128 Thus, when a corporation is found li-
able, pursuant to CERClA, for the costs of cleaning up a hazardous 
waste site, it would be entirely appropriate for shareholders to file de-
rivative suits against directors and officers in order to impose personal 
liability upon them for any losses the corporation may suffer.I29 
121 See id. at 643-44. 
122 See id. 
123 [d. (quoting Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Del. 1966)). 
124 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 641. 
125 See id. at 641-42. 
126 See id. 
127 See, e.g., George Wells, FederalJudge Finds HerculRs, Uniroyal LiablR for $102 Million Ver-
tacSiteCleanup, 29 Env'tRep. (BNA) 1299,1299-1300 (1998). 
128 See infra notes 241-242 and accompanying text. 
129 See id. 
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II. CERCLA 
A. Legislative History and Purpose 
Mter the Love Canal tragedy, which left the homes and schools at 
Love Canal "virtually afloat on a toxic stew," the American public was 
concerned about the dangers posed by inactive hazardous waste sites 
and by improperly disposed wastes.130 In response to this concern, 
and in recognition of the fact that existing environmental laws did not 
adequately protect people from the threats imposed by hazardous 
wastes, Congress enacted CERCLA, also known as the Superfund, in 
1980.131 
CERCLA was enacted hastily, and was the product of numerous 
compromises within Congress,132 As a result, the statute's legislative 
history is sparse and vague.133 Notwithstanding the lack of useful his-
tory, the House Committee specified that one of its overriding goals 
was "to provide for liability for persons responsible for releases of haz-
ardous waste."134 Moreover, one federal district court ascertained that 
Congress not only wanted to impose costs where they belonged, but 
that it also wanted to encourage care and responsibility in the han-
dling of hazardous waste,135 Thus, aside from the imposition of penal-
ties, CERCLA also has a prophylactic objective inducing potential vio-
lators to properly dispose of their wastes. 136 
130 See ZYGMUNT lB. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw, 
AND SOCIETY 803-05 (2d ed. 1998); Robert T. Lee, Comprehensive Response, Compensation 
and LiaiJility Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK 225, 225 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 
13th ed. 1995); see generally H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.CAN.6119. 
131 See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 6120. The 
term "Superfund" is derived from the statute's "Hazardous Substance Superfund," which 
can be used to cover response costs. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994). 
132 See Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 
1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see generally 1 THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND: 
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY xviii-xxi (1982). 
133 See Chemical Waste Management, 669 F. Supp. at 1290 n.6. 
134 H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 1, reprinted in 1980 V.S.C.CAN. at 6119. 
135 See Chemical Waste Management, 669 F. Supp. at 1290 n.6. 
136 See id.; see also H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 
6120. 
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B. Enforcement Provisions 
There are two general enforcement provisions within CERCLA.137 
The first, and lesser known, is the abatement action.138 If there is an 
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance, then the fed-
eral government may seek appropriate relief in order to abate the 
possible resulting harms.139 Moreover, CERCLA levies fines on parties 
who do not follow abatement orders.140 
CERCLA's better-known and perhaps more powerful enforce-
ment mechanism is its cleanup liability provision.l41 If there is a re-
lease, or a threatened release, of a hazardous substance from a facility, 
and response costs, namely the costs of cleaning up the damage from 
the release, are incurred, then any of the four potential parties 
defined by the statute can be liable under the law'l42 
C. Parties 
There are four possible parties who may be subject to liability 
under CERCLA.l43 The first group includes those who own or operate 
the vessel or facility from which the pollution emanates.l44 Second, 
any person who owned a facility at the time hazardous substances 
were disposed of at that facility can be liable if those substances are 
eventually released into the environment.l45 Third, any person who 
arranged for the transport of hazardous substances can also be li-
able. l46 Finally, any person who accepts or has accepted hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities can be li-
able if those substances are ever released into the environment.l47 
Thus, virtually all who come into contact, or can come into contact, 
with hazardous wastes are within the ambit of CERCLA.l48 This is es-
pecially true since the statute defines "person" as an "individual, firm, 
137 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607 (1994). 
U8 See id. § 9606(a). 
139 See id.; see generaUy Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. Unites States Envtl. Protection Agency, 
812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). 
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1). 
141 See id. § 9607. 
142 See id. § 9607(a) (4). 
143 See id. 
144 See id. § 9607 (a) (1). 
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 
146 See id. § 9607 (a) (3). 
147 Seeid. § 9607(a) (4). 
148 See id. § 9607 (a) . . 
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corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, 
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, 
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. "149 
D. Darnages 
In a CERClA recovery action, the party that cleaned up hazard-
ous wastes which were released into the environment, whether it is a 
governmental entity or a private party, can recover all response costs 
from any liable party.I50 In addition, the responsible parties may also 
be liable for damages to natural resources and certain health assess-
ments performed after the release. I51 CERClA imposes strict liability 
on responsible parties, and in multi-party situations, liability is also 
joint and several. I52 
As a result of the numerous party and liability options, the dam-
age possibilities under CERClA are quite high, particularly for indus-
trial corporations.I53 For example, in October 1998, two corporations 
were sued for a CERClA recovery by the United States government in 
an Arkansas federal court. I54 The defendants were liable for the 
cleanup of a herbicide plant, which produced, among other toxins, 
Agent Orange.I55 During the cleanup, the EPA burned barrels which 
were stored at the site, destroyed all of the plant equipment and 
buildings, incinerated contaminated top soil, and pumped wells in 
order to draw and dispose of contaminated ground water. I56 The site 
cleanup cost the government more than $102 million, costs for which 
the defendants were jointly and severally liable. I57 
149 [d. § 9601(21). 
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(A)-(B). 
151 See id. § 9607(a) (4) (C)-(D). 
152 See Lee, supra note 130, at 242 (citing Levin Meals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal 
Co., 799 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)); see also H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136. 
153 See Wells, supra note 127, at 1299-1300. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. at 1299. 
156 See id. at 1299-1300. 
157 See id. 
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E. Officers and Directors 
1. Direct and Derivative Officer Liability 
Where corporate actors have been held liable for CERClA viola-
tions, it has been through direct, rather than derivative, liability. ISS 
This means that it is not necessary for the plaintiff, be it the govern-
ment or otherwise, to impose derivative liability by "piercing the cor-
porate veil. "159 
When the corporate veil is pierced, the plaintiff breaks beyond 
the limited liability protection of the corporate form, and reaches the 
personal assets of the corporate actor. I60 This means that the funda-
mental feature of the corporate form, i.e., the limited liability of those 
who run the corporation, is violated. I61 Piercing the corporate veil is a 
difficult process because courts will typically only pierce the veil in 
instances where the corporate form is used for an improper or an il-
legal purpose.162 
Direct liability, in contrast to the derivative liability described 
above, is imposed when a director or officer is personally liable be-
cause of his direct personal participation in the commission of a tor-
tious or illegal act, even if the act was committed on behalf of the cor-
poration in good faith.I63 Although liability under CERLCA is usually 
presumed to attach directly,164 there have been a few instances when 
courts have undertaken analyses of derivative liability.16s 
One such case was Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., where a 
Louisiana district court refused to allow CERClA liability to be im-
158 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1994). 
159 See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052-53; Sidney S. Arst Co., 25 F.3d at 420-21; see 
generally CLARK, supra note 4, at 71-85; ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, CORPORATIONS: ENVI-
RONMENTAL CASES AND MATERIALS 29-30 (1994). 
160 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 71; GELTMAN, supra note 159, at 29-30; see also Kinney 
Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991); In reSilicone Gel Breast Implants 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1447, 1452-53 (N.D. Ala. 1995). 
161 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 2, 71-85. Limited liability provides protection for the in-
vestors in the corporation. See id. at 7-10. Unless the veil is pierced, corporate shareholders 
are not liable for any corporate loss that goes beyond the amount of their investment. See 
id. at 7. 
162 See id. at 71-85. 
163 See, e.g., Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1980). 
164 See GELTMAN, supra note 159, at 30; see also infra notes 186-188 and accompanying 
text. 
165 See generally Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (WD. 
La. 1988); Brovming-Ferris Indus. of Ill. v. Ter-Maat, 13 F. Stipp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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posed upon individual corporate officers.166 The district court rea-
soned that the corporate form "is a doctrine firmly entrenched in 
American jurisprudence," and that as such, it "may not be disre-
garded absent a specific congressional directive."167 Since, according 
to the court, there was nothing in the clear language or the legislative 
history of CERCLA that provided liability for individual corporate 
officers, such liability could not be imposed.168 The corporate doc-
trines which the court discussed in support of this finding, however, 
all relate to the limited liability of shareholders, not that of directors 
and officers.169 Thus, the application of Joslyn Ccrrp. in the CERCLA 
context for officers and directors is limited, since virtually all other 
courts have distinguished between protection for shareholders and 
protection for officers and directors.17o 
This issue came up again in a recent decision from the Northern 
District of Illinois, Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter 
Maat. l7l In that case, the court refused to impose liability on a corpo-
rate officer unless the plaintiffs could show that he was "derivatively 
'liable under state veil-piercing law."172 Since the plaintiffs could not 
prove facts sufficient to justifY piercing the corporate veil, the defen-
dant officer was not held liable for the CERCLA violation.173 
However, the Browning-Ferris decision is contrary to precedent in 
the higher federal appeals court and generally accepted standards of 
CERCLA liability for corporate officers.174 In Sidney S. Arst Co. v. 
Pipefitters Welfare Education Fund, the Seventh Circuit specifically stated 
that "despite the ... shield protecting corporate officers and directors 
from 'responsibility for corporate violations, corporate officers and 
directors may well be liable" under CERCLA.175 Moreover, the Sev-
166 See 696 E Supp. at 224-25. 
167 [d. at 226. 
168 See id.; but see United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879, 20,883 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (holding individual officer liable for corporation's CERCLA 
violation in part because doing so "furthers the legislative intent to impose liability for 
response costs upon the parties responsible for creation of hazardous waste sites"). 
169 SeeJoslyn Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 226. 
170 See infra notes 256-266 and accompanying text. 
17l See generally 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N .D. Ill. 1998); see also C01porate Officer Has No Liabil-
ity Unless Veil Can Be Pierced, Court Says, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 842,842-43 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Piercing Liability]. But see Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 
417,420-21 (7th Cir. 1994). 
172 Browning-Ferris, 13 E Supp. 2d at 765. 
173 See id. at 765-66. 
174 See, e.g., Sidney S. Arst Co., 25 F.3d at 420-21; GELTMAN, supra note 159, at 29. 
175 25 F.3d at 420. 
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enth Circuit distinguished between derivative liability and the direct 
liability that CERClA provides.176 While the Browning-Ferris court did 
recognize the precedent set forth by the Seventh Circuit, the opinion 
also considered the intervening United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in United States v. Bestfoods in order to reach its contrary result)77 
In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court held that when state law allowed, 
a parent corporation could be liable for the CERClA violations of its 
subsidiary,178 Justice Souter's opinion also noted that when a plaintiff 
brings a CERClA claim, that does not mean "that the entire corpus of 
state corporation law is to be replaced," and as a result, courts should 
look to state corporation laws even when dealing with federal statutes 
that apply to corporations.179 In applying this holding, the Browning-
Ferris court stated that the Bestfoods precedent "directly applie[d] to, 
and therefore trump [ed] " the opinion in Sidney S. Arst that was 
handed down earlier by the Seventh Circuit.180 Thus, according to the 
Browning-Ferris court, the only way for the plaintiffs in that case to im-
pose personal liability on the defendant officer would be by piercing 
the corporate veil.181 
Assistant Attorney General Lois Schiffer of the Unites States De-
partment of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, 
who argued the Bestfoods case, wrote a letter urging the Illinois district 
court to reconsider its Browning-Ferris decision because, in her opin-
ion, the court misread the Supreme Court precedent)82 She said that 
the Supreme Court had "recognized two paths to parent liability: de-
rivative liability through the subsidiary, and direct liability through the 
corporation's own actions. "183 Thus, in her opinion, and in that of vir-
tually all federal courts,184 a veil-piercing analysis, even after Bestfoods, 
is only necessary for derivative liability, not for direct liability under 
CERClA.185 
176 See id. 
177 See Brollming-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
178 See 118 S. Ct. 1876.1885-86 (1998). 
179Id. (quoting Burksv. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979». 
180 Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765; see Sidney S. Arst Co., 25 F.3d at 420-21. 
181 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
182 See Piercing Liability, supra note 171, at 842. 
183 Id. at 842-43; see also Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889 (stating that "a parent can be held 
directly liable when the parent operates the facility"). 
184 See infra notes 189-227 and accompanying text. 
185 See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1883-90; Piercing Liability, supra note 171, at 842-43. 
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2. Direct Liability Precedent 
When corporate officers and directors are held personally liable 
under CERClA, the liability that is imposed is direct, and thus is 
predicated on the actor's involvement in the pollution incident or 
with the particular facility.186 Officers and directors have not been 
held liable merely because of their positions as officers and direc-
tors.187 The reason for this limitation stems in part from CERClA's 
definition of "covered persons" and judicial interpretations of that 
definition.188 
One of the first cases that established direct officer liability under 
CERClA was United States v. Carolawn Co., a South Carolina district 
court case.189 In Carolawn, the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), brought a recovery action for the cleanup of a 
hazardous substance disposal and storage site in South Carolina.190 
The EPA argued that corporate officials who engaged in hazardous 
waste disposal activities could be subject to individual liability under 
CERClA.19l The court agreed with the EPA's argument, and followed 
the recent decision of a Missouri district court in United States v. North 
Eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.,192 holding the defendants 
individually liable.193 
The Carolawn court based its reasoning first on its reading of 
CERClA's definition of "owner or operator. "194 The court noted that 
the text and the structure of the definition used terms which "con-
186 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 263; Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Corparate 
Law Principles With CERCLA Liability for Environmental Hazards, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 
(1993) (noting that under CERCLA, directors and officers have only been held personally 
liable when they personally participated in the polluting activity). 
187 See Schipani, supra note 186, at 2. 
188 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); United States v. Northeastern Phann. & Chem. Co., 
Inc., 810 F.2d 726,744 (8th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding officer 
liable because of his actual participation in pollution incidents, not because of his position 
within company);Joslyn Corp. v. T.L.James & Co., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (W.D. La. 
1988) (holding that the court would not hold officers individually liable without specific 
congressional directive). 
189 See generally 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C.June 15, 1984). For a 
summary and discussion of the majOl' pI'ecedents in this area, and how they relate to each 
other, see Schipani, supra note 186, at 5-10. 
190 See 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envd. L. Inst.) at 20,699. 
191 Seeid. at 20,700. 
192 See 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th 
Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). This case will be discussed in more detail be-
low. See infra notes 211-218 and accompanying text. 
193 See Caroiallm, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envd. L. lnst.) at 20,700. 
194 See id. 
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note[d], individual, personal involvement" with the activity that re-
sulted in the CERCLA violation.195 Therefore, according to the South 
Carolina district court, "to the extent that an individual has control or 
authority over the activities of a facility from which hazardous sub-
stances are released or participates in the management of such a facil-
ity, he may be held liable for response costs incurred at the facility. "196 
Thus, the Carolawn case established the important principle that even 
though corporate officers are typically shielded from individual liabil-
ity for their actions on behalf of the company,197 CERCLA would im-
pose direct costs on officers who were in charge of facilities that vio-
lated CERCLA.198 
While Carolown's analysis focused on the corporate actor's control 
over the facility,199 United States v. Mottolo, which was handed down the 
same year, focused on the officer's participation in the particular pol-
lution incident.20o In Mottolo, a New Hampshire district court looked 
beyond the language of CERCLA itself to the general rule "that an 
officer of a corporation is liable for torts in which he personally par-
ticipated, whether or not he was acting within the scope of his author-
ity. "201 In this case, since the defendant, who was the president and 
principal shareholder of the violating corporation, participated in ar-
ranging for the disposal of hazardous wastes, he was potentially liable 




197 See generally CLARK, supra note 4, at 123-40 (discussing protections for officers and 
directors) . 
198 See Caroiallfn, l4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700; accord United States v. 
Bliss, 20 EnvtI. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879, 20,883 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (holding 
corporate officer liable in CERCLA action in part because he "had the authority to control 
the disposal of hazardous waste and to prevent the damage cansed by disposal at the site"). 
Cf United States v. Kayser-RotIl Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding 
parent corporation liable for subsidiary's CERCLA violations since parent had control over 
environmental matters). 
199 See 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700. 
200 See 629 F. Supp. 56, 59-60 (D.N.H. 1984). 
201 [d. at 60 (citing Escude Cruz v. OrtIlO Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 
1980)); see also Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating 
that "[o)fficers who take part in the commission of a tort by tIle corporation may be held 
personally liable therefor"). 
202 See Mott%, 629 F. Supp. at 58-60; accord Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. 
Co., 777 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding that corporate officers can be liable 
for CERCLA violations if they personally participated in polluting activity). 
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In the 1985 case of New Yark v. Share Realty Carp., the Second Cir-
cuit validated the Carolawn decision by holding the defendant person-
ally liable under CERCLA because of his position of authority within 
the corporation.203 The Second Circuit agreed with the Carolawn 
court's reading of CERCLA204 and the notion that CERCLA liability 
could be grounded in the fact that the officer was "in charge of the 
operation. "205 
During the same year, another Missouri district court considered 
the issue of officer/director liability in United States v. Conservation 
Chemical CO.206 In that case, the district court adopted a special mas-
ter's opinion which expanded on the notions set forth by previous 
courts.207 The court held that a motion for summary judgment should 
be denied to a defendant on the issue of personal liability because 
such liability could be imposed "if it could be established that his par-
ticipation was of the nature and degree which would warrant the im-
position of personal liability. "208 Thus, this ruling reinforced the Mot-
tolo result, which grounded liability in the actor's participation in the 
event,209 and added the notion that the "nature" and "degree" of par-
ticipation could also be considered in determining liability.210 
In 1986, the Eighth Circuit handed down one of the most impor-
tant and influential cases determining corporate officer liability under 
CERCLA.2l1 In United States v. Nartheastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical 
Co., Inc. (NEPACCO), the United States brought a CERCLA action 
against the defendants for dumping toxic chemicals on a parcel of 
rural farmland.212 One of the defendants was an officer of the liable 
corporation and had arranged for the transport of the chemicals in 
question.213 He argued that he could not be held individually liable 
for the corporation's wrongful conduct because he was merely acting 
203 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Caro-
lawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700. 
204 See 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700. 
205 Shore Realty CO/p., 759 F.2d at 1052. 
206 See general(y 619 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mo. 1985). 
207 See id. at 190. 
208Id. 
209 See generally 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984). 
210 See id.; accord United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 190 (D. 
Mo. 1985) (holding that defendant could be liable "if it were established that his participa-
tion was of the nature and degree which would warrant imposition of personal liability") . 
211 See generally United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc. (NEPACCO), 
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). 
212 See id. at 730. 
213 See id. 
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on behalf of the corporation as one of its officers or employees.214 
The Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that since the officer in ques-
tion "actually participated" in the company's CERClA violations by 
personally arranging for the transportation and disposal of hazardous 
waste, he could be held individually liable, notwithstanding the pro-
tections of the corporate form. 215 
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit specifically stated that the defen-
dant's liability was personal, and that such liability was direct and "dis-
tinct from the derivative liability that results from 'piercing the corpo-
rate veil. "'216 Thus, unlike the few courts that required piercing the 
corporate veil to impose liability,217 the NEPACCO court explicitly 
stated that piercing the corporate veil was unnecessary due to the de-
fendant's personal involvement.218 
One final case of note, and one that perhaps illustrates the future 
of CERClA enforcement against officers and directors, is Kelley ex reI. 
Michigan Natural Resources Commission v. Arco Industries Corp., decided 
in 1989 by the Western District of Michigan.219 In Kelley, the court held 
that an officer could be personally liable under CERLCA.220 What was 
innovative about this decision, which was limited to closely held cor-
porations,221 was that it considered the corporate actor's ability to 
"prevent or significantly abate[]" the release, not just his personal in-
volvement or control over the facility itself.222 Thus, this extended the 
scope of possible liability far beyond the previous precedents,223 since 
in this case actual participation or direct control was not necessary to 
impose personal liability on the officer. 
The Kelley court reasoned that when a CERClA action seeks to 
impose liability beyond the corporate form, i.e., without piercing the 
veil, then the officer's or director's power to control "the practice and 
policy" of the corporation, and thus prevent the resulting harm, 
214 See id. at 744. 
215 See id. 
216 NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744. 
217 See generally Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988); 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of II\.. Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. II\, 1998). 
218 See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744. 
219 See generally 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
220 See id. at 1218-20. 
221 Although there is no precise definition, Dean Clark defines a closely held cOlpora-
tion as one that has "only a smal1 number ... of individual shareholders and whose shares 
are not traded on a recognized securities exchange or an over-the-counter market." 
CLARK, supra note 4, at 24. 
222 Kelley, 723 F. Supp. at 1220. 
223 See supra notes 189-218 and accompanying text. 
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should be the focus of the analysis.224 This case may be the first step 
toward CERClA liability for corporate officials in their roles as such, 
rather than based on their personal involvement in a pollution inci-
dent or their control over a facility.225 Such an expansion could lead 
to an increased role for directors and officers in the handling of haz-
ardous waste, since personal liability could be imposed upon them 
even when such activities were beyond their purview.226 The Kelley 
court made sure to note, however, that even under its expanded view, 
CERClA liability depends upon more than mere status as a corporate 
officer or director.227 
III. ANALYSIS 
This portion of the Comment will begin by arguing that current 
CERClA coverage is not sufficient to implement the ideals of the law. 
Next, it will discuss possible paradigms of liability for directors and 
officers through derivative suits. Finally, it will illustrate possible ob-
stacles to such suits and how shareholder plaintiffs could overcome 
them. 
A. Current CERCLA Coverage is not Sufficient 
Under the current state of the law, all CERClA liability for 
officers and directors is predicated on participation or controI.228 Al-
though the opinion in Kelley ex reI. Michigan Natural Resources Commis-
sion v. Arco Industries Corp. was less predicated on participation than 
previous decisions were, the Michigan district court made sure to 
mention that mere status as an officer or director was not sufficient to 
impose liability.229 Moreover, the opinion's analysis has not been fol-
lowed by any other court.230 Accordingly, corporate officers and direc-
tors who do not participate in activities that result in CERClA viola-
tions are free from personal CERClA liability.231 There is no direct 
negative incentive in place for those non-participating officials to 
monitor the behavior of their subordinates to prevent CERClA liabil-
224 See Kelley, 723 F. Stipp. at 1219. 
225 See id. at 1220. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
228 See Schipani, supra note 186, at 6-9. 
229 See 723 F. Stipp. at 1220. 
230 See id.; Schipani, supra note 186, at 9. 
231 See Kelley, 723 F. Stipp. at 1221; Schipani, supra note 186, at 9. 
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ity.232 Considering the high societal costs exacted by improper haz-
ardous waste disposal,233 and the costs to corporations that are liable 
under CERCLA,234 this lack of incentive to "monitor" the environ-
mental activities and possible liabilities of the corporation is inappro-
priate.235 
This lack of an incentive is especially troubling in light of the im-
portance and effectiveness of monitoring systems.236 According to an 
attorney at 1998's Environmental Enforcement Conference, corpora-
tions that do not have effective compliance programs "are just jeop-
ardizing themselves. "237 Such compliance and monitoring programs 
are invaluable tools to aid the corporation in avoiding CERCLA and 
other environmental liabilities.238 In addition to providing notice to 
high-level executives and corporate Boards, monitoring systems also 
deter employees from violating laws.239 Moreover, the benefits of such 
programs flow not only to the corporation, which would avoid poten-
tial liabilities, but also to society, since the environmental harms that 
result from CERCLA violations would be avoided.240 
If officers and directors were personally liable in instances when 
their companies were penalized under CERCLA, then those corpo-
rate actors would be more likely to install prophylactic measures, such 
as monitoring systems, in order to avoid such liability.241 The deriva-
232 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 4 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that 
"[t]he concept of man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest implies that people re-
spond to incentives-that if a person's surroundings change in such a way that he could 
increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so"). 
233 See generally H.R. REp. No. 96--1016, at pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6119. 
234 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 127, at 1299-1300. 
235 Cf United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879,20,833 (E.D. Mo. 
Sept. 27, 1988). In Bliss, the court held an individual officer liable in part because doing so 
furthered "the legislative intent to impose liability ... upon the parties responsible for 
creation of hazardous waste sites." See id.; cf In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959,969 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
236 See Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 1068; Webb, et aI., supra note 39, at 657-59. 
Cf Janey Cohen, Creation of Systems to Prevent Violations Still Seen as Best Defense for Companies, 
29 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 473, 473-74 (1998) (describing a conference where one speaker 
reported that "a company's best defense is to 'set up systems to avoid anything in violation 
of [international] environmental laws") . 
237 Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 1068. 
238 See id.; Webb et aI., supra note 39, at 657-59. 
239 See Webb et aI., supra note 39, at 657-58. 
240 See Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 473-74. 
241 See generally POSNER, supra note 232. 
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tive suit could be a useful mechanism for shareholders to effect such 
personal liability for "failure to monitor. "242 
Another reason that shareholders may want to use derivative suits 
is to impose liability on officers and directors despite court-imposed 
limitations on the application ofCERCLA.243 Although the decision in 
Kelley ex reI. Michigan Natural Resources Commission v. Arco Industries 
Corp. may have seemed like one district court's attempt to expand 
officer and director liability to include a failure to prevent harm, this 
decision has not yet been followed by any other court.244 Accordingly, 
if courts follow the example set by the Northern District of Illinois in 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois v. Ter Maat,245 and refuse to impose 
CERCLA liability on officers and directors in instances when the cor-
porate veil cannot be pierced, the liability for such corporate actors 
will be severely limited because of the difficulties associated with 
piercing the corporate veil. 246 
Even if the courts follow the Browning-Ferris example and restrict 
CERCLA liability for officers and directors, shareholders could ac-
count for such limitations by effecting personal liability through de-
rivative suits.247 However, in order for such suits to succeed, share-
holder plaintiffs would need to cross the thresholds of the BJR and 
other procedurallimitations.248 
B. Different Paradigms of Possible Liability Through Derivative Suits 
1. Directors or Officers Who are Aware of CERCLA Violations 
After Browning-Ferris, it seems likely that CERCLA liability could 
be imposed on corporations as entities, while officers and directors 
remain immune from personal liability.249 As long as the corporate 
242 Cf In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
243 See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224-26 (W.D. La. 1988); 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765-66 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
244 See 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989); see also supra notes 189-218 and 
accompanying text. 
245 The Browning-Ferris decision was contrary to the great weight of federal opinion. See, 
e.g., United States v. North Eastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 
F. Supp. 162, 190 (D. Mo. 1985); Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 
1036,1039 (D. Mass. 1991). 
246 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66; see also CLARK, supra note 4, at 71-85. 
247 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66. 
248 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 639-64; see generally DEMOTT, supra note 118. 
249 See 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66. 
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veil cannot be pierced, which is likely in most circumstances,25o 
officers and directors will not be personally liable under Browning-
Ferris. 251 Moreover, since many courts refuse to impose liability on 
officers and directors who have not somehow participated in the vio-
lation, officers and directors could be immune from liability even in 
instances where they know about the violation, but are not direct par-
ticipants.252 
Although directors and officers can typically rely on the protec-
tion of the BJR when they make business decisions, those who know-
ingly allow CERCLA violations would not be entitled to such protec-
tion because of the general notion that illegal activity is not within the 
BJR's scope.253 Moreover, the duties set forth in the RMBCA, and the 
state corporation laws which are based on it, would prescribe against 
allowing such activity.254 
As mentioned above, it is generally accepted that the BJR does 
not apply in instances where corporate actors violate the law.255 Al-
though directors or officers who merely condone activities that result 
in CERCLA violations would not themselves be violating the law, in 
circumstances such as those in tlle case of Miller v. American Telegraph 
& Telephone Co., directors and officers should also be denied the pro-
tection of the BJR.256 Recall that in Miller; the shareholder plaintiffs 
were allowed to proceed with their suit against the directors since the 
directors failed to take any action to collect on the debt due from the 
Democratic National Committee.257 The directors themselves did not 
actively violate any law, but they neglected to take action to prevent a 
violation of the law which they presumably knew was taking place.258 
The scenario in Miller is arguably similar to a situation where ex-
ecutives and/or Board members knowingly allowed CERCLA viola-
tions to take place, but those particular corporate actors were not di-
250 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 71-85. 
251 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66. 
252 See Schipani, supra note 186, at 6-9; but see Kelley ex rei. Mich. Natural Resources 
Comm'n, 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
253 See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cil". 1974); but see 
Beveridge, supra note 42, at 776-80; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271. 
254 See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.01, 8.42 (1984); AMERICAN LAw INSTI-
TUTE, supra note 66, at § 3.02. 
255 See, e.g., Miller, 507 F.2d at 763; Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (N.Y 1947), 
reh'gdenied, 75 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y 1974); Roth v. Robertson, 1I8 N.YS. 351,352-54 (Super. 
Ct. 1909). 
256 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763. 
257 See id. at 761. 
258 See id. 
770 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:741 
recdy involved in the illegal activity.259 The same principles that al-
lowed the Miller plaintiffs to proceed in the context of campaign 
finance laws should also apply to CERClA violations, and corporate 
officers and directors should be held personally liable for failing to 
prevent CERClA violations which they knew were occurring.260 
In addition, the rationale in Millerwas based upon more than the 
actual violation of the law, but also upon the fact that the corporation 
had contravened a clearly expressed policy of Congress.261 Although 
CERClA's policy goals and legislative history are not models of clarity, 
it is generally agreed that the statute was passed in order to respond 
to the threats posed by hazardous waste, to impose liability on the par-
ties responsible for the release of hazardous substances, and to en-
courage maximum care and responsibility in the handling of hazard-
ous waste.262 For corporate officials to allow or approve of actions that 
offend these policy goals is analogous to the actions of the Board in 
the Miller case when it allowed violations of federal campaign laws.263 
This analogy is particularly fitting since, like the situation in 
Miller, the shareholders in the hypothetical are within the class pro-
tected by the statute at issue, i.e., possible victims of pollution, and the 
statute's policies can only be effectuated if corporate actors are re-
strained from allowing the corporation to violate the statute since 
corporations are often the liable parties in CERClA actions. 264 Also, 
since courts may require piercing the corporate veil in CERClA ac-
tions after decisions such as Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. 
Ter Maat,265 the shareholder derivative action could be an important 
tool to complement CERClA actions in effecting CERClA's policy 
goals, and thus courts may be more likely to allow such suits to pro-
ceed.266 
259 See id.; if. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act, 42 u.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). 
260 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 761-63. 
261 See id. at 763. 
262 See Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 
1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987); H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. 
263 See 507 F.2d at 763. 
264 See id. For some examples of cases in which corporations were liable for CERLCA 
violations, see generally Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501 (W.D. Okla. 1990); GRM Indus., Inc. v. 
Wickes Mfg. Co., 749 F. Supp. 810 (W.D. Mich. 1990). 
265 See generally 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
266 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763. 
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2. Directors or Officers Who are Unaware of the CERClA Violation 
In instances when directors or officers are not aware of the CER-
ClA violations of lower-level employees, they would almost certainly 
be free from CERClA liability.267 For shareholder plaintiffs who seek 
to impose liability on officers or directors for such subordinate CER-
ClA violations, there are at least two possible avenues for them to 
pursue. The first avenue is through a theory that, as a result of cases 
such as Francis v. United Jersey Bank, there are certain circumstances 
when the Board and/or certain officers should have been aware of 
the activity, and thus should have taken action in order to prevent the 
CERClA violation and prevent losses to the corporation.268 The sec-
ond, and perhaps more difficult theory, is that the Board and/or 
officers should have implemented adequate monitoring systems that 
would have brought the illegal activities of lower-level employees to 
their attention and would have assisted the officers and directors in 
preventing the CERClA violations.269 
a. Directors and Officers Who Should Have Known About the CERCLA Viola-
tions 
Any officer or Board member of a corporation who deals with 
industrial wastes should be on notice that CERClA liability could pos-
sibly result from the corporation's activities.270 This is true because the 
materials that are subject to CERClA regulations are listed in the 
statute,271 and also because CERClA is such a well-known aspect of 
industrial regulation that any properly informed corporate official 
would be apprised of the law's requirements and how they could im-
pact the operations of the business. 272 
Thus, if corporations incur CERClA liability, their Boards 
and/ or officers could be . like the defendant in Francis, whose lack of 
267 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); see also Schipani, supra note 186, at 6-9. 
268 See432A.2d 814,822-23 (NJ-1981). 
269 See In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
270 See 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a). 
271 See id. § 9601 (14). 
272 See id. § 9607(a); Francis, 432 A.2d at 822-23. It is generally agreed that CERCLA is 
one of the best-known and perhaps most-feared environmental regulations due to its high 
liability possibilities and its use of strict liability in imposing fault. See generally Percy L. 
Angelo & Lynn L. Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and Its 
Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REv. 10 1 (1985). An article about the statute, 
intended for corporate lawyers, warned that it was "a problem that [would] be with [them] 
for some years to come." Id. at 121. 
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knowledge about the customs and laws of her corporation's industry 
permitted illegal acts which caused losses to the corporation.273 In 
that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held the defendant liable 
because, had she been knowledgeable about proper industry stan-
dards as she should have been, she would have been able to prevent 
the losses that resulted from the illegal actions.274 Similarly, directors 
and officers who are knowledgeable about CERCLA could perhaps 
use that information to prevent the imposition of liability on the cor-
poration.275 On the other hand, if directors and officers do not have 
such knowledge, and it would have assisted them in preventing the 
losses, then they could be liable for breach of their duty of care under 
the same rationale as the Francis defendant if CERClA liabilities are 
imposed on the corporation.276 
b. Failure to Monitor 
Cases such as Francis and Smith v. Van Gorkom make it clear that 
adequate information is of the utmost importance for directors and 
officers in their satisfaction of the duty of care.277 Since monitoring is 
such an effective tool in information-gathering,278 the premium 
placed on information has led to the possible "duty to monitor" that 
Chancellor Allen discussed in In re Caremark International Derivative 
Litigation.279 In that case, the Chancellor specifically stated that the 
failure to implement an adequate monitoring system could be a viola-
tion of the duty of care.280 
This should be especially true in the context of CERCLA and 
other environmental laws.281 When corporations deal with the sub-
stances that are covered under CERCLA, they should have monitoring 
systems in place so that the Board and senior management can pre-
clude the heavy losses that follow recovery actions.282 If a corporation 
does not have a monitoring system in place, and because of that fail-
ure to implement such a system, CERCLA violations occur without the 
273 See 432 A.2d at 819. 
274 See id. at 825-26, 829. 
275 See id.; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877-78 (Del. 1985). 
276 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 825-26. 
277 See id.; 488 A.2d at 875-78. 
278 See Cohen, supra note 236, at 473-74; Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 1067-68; 
Webb, supra note 39, at 657-63. 
279 See 698 A.2d 959, 968-70 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
280 See id. at 970. 
28} See id. at 968-70; see generally Wells, supra note 127, at 1299-1300. 
282 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968-70. 
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Board's knowledge, those violations would be the result of the Board's 
and senior management's failure to satisfY their duty of care.283 
This is not only a result of the Caremark analysis,284 but it also fol-
lows directly from Francis v. United Jersey Bank.285 In that case, part of 
the court's rationale for imposing personal liability was that the de-
fendant did not follow the custom and practice of her industry, which 
led to her failure to notice and stop the illegal activities which caused 
damage to the corporation.286 It is now customary in most industries 
to have some sort of monitoring system to prevent violations of law.287 
Since such systems are the norm due to their effectiveness, a reason-
able officer or director would implement such systems in order to 
prevent losses to the corporation.288 If a director's or officer's failure 
to comply with this industry custom led to a situation where losses 
where incurred by the corporation, then that director or officer 
would be analogous to the defendant in Fran cis. 289 Thus, shareholder 
plaintiffs could claim that the Board's or the officers' failure to follow 
common practice was a violation of their duty of care.290 
Also, even though the Chancellor did say that once a system is 
established, the design of that system is a question of business judg-
ment and is left to the discretion of the Board, there would still be 
instances in which the failure of the system itself could be due to duty 
of care violations.291 All business judgments must be made with 
sufficient information, and the implementation of a monitoring sys-
tem should be no different.292 Thus, if a corporation's system failed to 
detect illegal activities by lower-level employees because the Board 
and/ or senior management created or accepted a system without 
adequate information, then that failure could be considered a duty of 
care violation.293 
283 See id. 
284 See id. 
285 See 432 A.2d 814, 825-26 (NJ. 1981). 
286 See id. 
287 See Webb et aI., supra note 39, at 656. A 1990 study found that of 711 corporations 
surveyed, eighty-five percent had some sort of monitoring system. See id. 
288 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 825-26. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. 
291 See In re Caremark InCl Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also 
han cis, 432 A.2d at 825-26; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877-78 (Del. 1985). 
292 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 825-26; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877-78; Caremark, 698 A.2d 
at 70. 
293 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877-78. 
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C. Possible Obstacles 
1. The Demand Requirement 
The demand requirement would almost certainly be excused in 
any shareholder action for a company that had violated CERClA.294 It 
should not be difficult for a plaintiff to plead that the demand would 
be futile, since it would call into question the interests of the directors 
or officers themselves.295 This would be true even for officials who 
were not personally implicated in the suit. 296 Even though their inter-
ests would not be called into question in the action itself, their rela-
tionship with those who were named in the suit could cloud their 
judgment on behalf of the corporation.297 Thus, the demand re-
quirement would probably be excused.298 
If, on the other hand, the plaintiffs did make a demand on the 
directors, and the directors refused to take action, the plaintiffs could 
show the conflict of interest involved and still proceed notwithstand-
ing the refusal. 299 This is due to the presumed nature of the claim that 
would be made against the corporation in the suit.300 It is presumed 
that the claim would be directly contrary to the personal interests of 
the Board.30l Thus, it seems that the demand requirement for deriva-
tive actions would not be a difficult hurdle for a plaintiff to cross.302 
2. Damage to the Corporation 
There is some disagreement as to whether or not violations of 
law, per se, are the cause of damage to a corporation.303 For example, 
according to Professor Daniel Fischel of the University of Chicago, 
corporate governance mechanisms such as shareholder suits are not 
appropriate in every instance where the law is violated.304 Rather, Pro-
fessor Fischel argues that if the gains from a violation of law exceed 
the social costs, i.e., the costs of the penalty, then for the corporation 
294 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 640-44. 
295 See id. at 641-42. 
296 See id. 
297 See id.; DEMOTT, supra note 118, at § 5:07. 
298 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 641-42; DEMOTT, supra note 118, at § 5:07. 
299 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 643-44; DEMOTT, supra note 118, at § 5:07. 
300 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 643-44. 
301 See id. 
302 See id. at 640-44. 
303 See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 42, at 776--80; Fischel, supra note 42, at 127l. 
304 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271. 
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to comply with that statute is undesirable since there is a net loss to 
the corporation.305 If society wants to curb corporate behavior, then 
voters should elect people who will increase the applicable penalties 
to change the compliance mechanisms so that undesirable behavior 
would result in a net loss to the corporation, and thus any director 
and/ or officer who ordered the activity would be violating their duty 
of care.306 
Professor Norwood Beveridge of the Oklahoma City University 
School of Law has made a similar argument based not on net loss but 
on the degree of wrong associated with the activity.307 He notes that 
although some commentators reject any cost-benefit justifications for 
illegal acts, the Board of Directors of United Parcel Service of Amer-
ica, Inc. (UPS) allowed its drivers to accrue more than $l.5 million in 
parking tickets in New York City during 1994.308 Although these tick-
ets do represent violations of law, the directors have not been liable 
for the technically illegal conduct.309 Thus, according to Beveridge's 
argument, there must be something about the relative triviality of 
these offenses that insulates the UPS Board from liability. 310 
It seems that both of these rationales would fail in the context of 
CERClA violations.311 Generally, the damages that are incurred in 
CERClA actions are so high that it would be difficult to imagine an 
instance when the net-loss rule would not be satisfied.312 The only 
manner in which any cost-benefit analysis would be satisfied is if the 
corporation made its calculations based on eluding the law and escap-
ing liability.313 However, even Professor Fischel's argument is based on 
obeying the laws or, presumably, making cost-benefit decisions based 
on paying any applicable fines or liabilities.314 
Moreover, using mere financial calculations in order to decide 
when to act illegally may seem appropriate in certain contexts, such as 
305 See id.; see also Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1974) (holding that corporate defendants could be liable in shareholder suit only if their 
violations of law resulted in a net loss to the corporation). 
306 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271. 
307 See Beveridge, supra note 42, at 730-31. 
308 See id. at 731. 
309 See id. 
310 See id. 
3ll See id. at 730-31; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271. 
312 See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974); Wells, 
supra note 127, at 1299-1300. 
313 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763 n.5; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271. 
314 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271 (noting that "[p ]erhaps all that can be said is that 
when a restriction on corporate conduct is embodied in a statute, it should be obeyed"). 
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UPS's parking tickets,315 but CERClA seems quite different since of-
ten, activities that result in CERClA liabilities carry with them a high 
probability of endangering human life and natural resources.316 Thus, 
these activities are not de minimis violations of law, but rather, the 
type of serious violations which result not only in financial costs to 
society, but also costs that cannot be enumerated in mere financial 
terms.317 Financial considerations, therefore, are not an appropriate 
form of measurement for these decisions, and the corporate law 
mechanism should recognize that fact, as it did with the illegal acts in 
Miller v. American Telegraph & Telephone Co.318 
In Miller, the Third Circuit specifically stated that even if the ille-
gal contribution was a sound business judgment, i.e., for the benefit 
of the corporation, the directors would not be insulated from liabil-
ity.319 This was true even though the contribution would have brought 
a great benefit to the corporation, namely the favor of the Democratic 
National Committee.32o Similarly, even though violations of CERClA 
could be an economic benefit to corporations, courts should, as the 
court in Miller did, consider such violations breaches of the duty of 
care.321 
3. The Shareholder Power Argument 
Some commentators believe that the derivative suit is an 
inefficient mechanism of corporate governance, and that it interferes 
with the ability of management and Boards to run the corporation as 
they see fit.322 This argument is based on the assumption that since 
they are involved with the day-to-day operations of the enterprise, 
corporate officials are in a better position than shareholders or courts 
to make decisions for the corporation.323 This argument further as-
sumes that the market is the fundamental mechanism of corporate 
governance, since any inefficient or improper decisions will be curbed 
315 See Beveridge, supra note 42, at 731. 
316 See id.; see also H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.CAN. 6119, 6120. 
317 See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 6120. 
318 See 507 F.2d 759, 763 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1974). 
319 See id. at 763. 
320 See id. 
321 See id. 
322 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 42, at 1290-91. 
323 See id. at 1288. 
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by decreased profits, lower stock prices, and eventually, a change in 
leadership.324 
In the CERClA context, however, fears that shareholders would 
interfere with the efficient management of the corporation are illogi-
cal and unfounded.325 CERClA suit plaintiffs would not be attempt-
ing to make the corporation do anything extraordinary, only comply 
with applicable law.326 This is not an imposition on a corporation's 
daily operations, but merely a corrective measure to ensure that the 
Board and officers satisfy their duty of care by remaining within the 
bounds of the law.327 As Miller has shown, such a suit is entirely appro-
priate and feasible. 328 Moreover, even a suit for failure to monitor 
would not be outside tinkering with the day-to-day operations of the 
corporations, but rather is an attempt by shareholders to compel the 
Board and management to take extra measures, designed by those 
inside the corporation itself, to ensure compliance.329 
CONCLUSION 
CERClA liability alone may not be sufficient to encourage the 
proper disposal of hazardous waste. Since CERClA only covers those 
who participate in the violating activities, and even this coverage may 
be limited if piercing the corporate veil is required to impose liability 
on officers and directors, the derivative suit could be a useful mecha-
nism to compel officers and directors to install monitoring systems 
that prevent CERClA violations. 
324 See id. 
325 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763. 
326 See id. 
327 See id. 
328 See id. 
329 See In reCaremark Int'\ Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996). 

